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Abstract 
Post-socialist transition raises crucial issues about the institutional setting of a market economy. The 
priority has been given to property rights, and privatization has been advocated as a means to depoliticize 
economic activities. The dismissal of external interventions, allied with the attraction to the American 
model and Hayekian ideas, often led to the introduction of minimal laws and wait for their evolutionary 
development. The failure of corporate and public governance, notably in Russia, helps to show why, on 
the contrary, democratically established legal rules are essential. Legislation should not only protect 
corporate shareholders and stakeholders, but more fundamentally all citizens against predatory collusive 
behavior of political, economic and criminal elites. 
JEL Classification: D23, K2, P3 




"No question is ever actually raised as to the State limiting freedom of contract in many 
directions and encouraging agreements of other sorts. It also necessarily appropriates through 
taxation a considerable part of the usufruct of things privately 'owned', thus modifying 
ownership in both its phases. And this modifying influence on private property extends rapidly 
in scope as the laissez faire theory of the State loses ground in the modern world". 
Frank H. Knight, 1921, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 
"Above all, we must bear in mind that the critical issue should be how to strengthen the 
legal base of free market capitalism: the property rights of shareholders and other owners of 
capital. Fraud and deception are thefts of property. In my judgment, more generally, unless the 
laws governing how markets and corporations function are perceived as fair, our economic 
system cannot achieve its full potential". 
Alan Greespan, July 16, 2002, testimony before the U.S. Senate  
 
Privatization and transition strategies implemented in post-socialist countries 
have been widely criticized (Kornai, 2000, Stiglitz, 2000, Andreff, 2003). The attention 
given to privatization, it was said, was too exclusive, leaving unanswered crucial issues 
about the general institutional setting of a market economy. Institutions should create 
order and reduce uncertainty, transaction costs and opportunism which hinder 
exchanges (North, 1990, 1991). According to the theory of property rights, private 
property rights and corporate ownership structures emerge endogenously as an optimal 
response balancing benefits and costs (Demsetz, 1967, 1983). Institutional economics 
                                                 
1 Université François Rabelais, UFR Droit, Economie et Sciences Sociales, 50 avenue Jean Portalis BP 
0607, 37206 Tours cedex 03, France. Mail :  jean-francois.nivet@univ-tours.fr. I acknowledge  the 
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tends however to reject this view of optimal outcomes. And the historical record shows 
that institutional environments are rarely conducive to efficient behavior and economic 
growth. 
The recent experience proves that reasoning in terms of universal “models” to 
imitate is hazardous. The Japanese system with the peculiar Japanese firm, praised in the 
1980s, has shown its limits. The Asian crisis in 1997 threw light on the perverse 
incestuous connections between governments, banks and big companies. The Rhineland 
capitalism based on developed social relations exhibits deep troubles. The Parmalat 
scandal questions the virtues of Italian family capitalism. The Enron and WorldCom 
affairs violently unveiled deep inadequacies of the American corporate governance 
system. Concerning transition economies, the Czech strategy based on massive voucher 
privatization has been initially favorably assessed, but scandals revealing flawed 
corporate governance qualified this judgment. Poland has then been the focus of 
attention, thanks to its impressive growth partly attributable to new private start-ups. Its 
current fiscal problems, combined with rising unemployment, put these achievements 
into perspective. 
Interestingly enough, corporate governance and the behavior of enterprises are 
central components of each story. Studies of corporate governance arrangements 
conclude that practices change over time, and no single optimal model can be identified 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Mayer, 1998, OECD, 1999). The bundle of rights and the 
quality of their enforcement differ greatly across common law and civil law countries, 
and among the latter, across French, German and Scandinavian subfamilies. The diverse 
protection of investors and stakeholders shapes their incentives and leads to 
differentiated ownership and financial structures (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999b). If 
management has a public good nature (Stiglitz, 1985, 2000), it requires institutional 
solutions in order to avoid under-supply, free riding behavior, and opportunism typical 
of public goods. The property rights theory and Coase theorem address these issues. 
But property rights can not be exhaustive, while transaction and negotiation costs make 
Coasian contracting often impossible. Complementary formal institutions, including 
laws, regulations, and accounting rules, prove essential. The post-communist transition 
entails a change in property rights and legal infrastructure as well as in state missions. 
Legal protection of property rights and contracts, corporate, bankruptcy, competition 
and securities laws were called for. This paper insists on the fundamental part of these 
formal institutions
2. 
Transition strategies based on simplistic Coasianism have been denounced and 
evolutionist Austrian ideas praised (Kornai, 2000, Stiglitz, 2000). Yet, Austrian views on 
the legal basis of a liberal society have been influential in post-socialist countries. It is 
rather natural, because most observers conclude from the real socialist experience that 
Hayek and Von Mises were right against Lange. The dominant approach of transition 
gave the priority to property rights (section 1), and dismissed state and legal 
interferences (section 2). Property rights and transaction costs theories, allied with 
liberal evolutionist conceptions of law, offer foundations for such a laissez faire strategy. 
                                                 
2 Few observers gave initially a great attention to this legal dimension. Fischer and Gelb (1991) insist on 
the need to quickly start legal overhaul and on the lengthy process it requires. In his discussion of 
Lipton and Sachs (1990), Summers remarks: “a nation whose legal infrastructure cannot stop blatant 
self-dealing by managers of huge enterprises seems unlikely to carry out any sort of corruption-free 
distribution of assets” (p. 335). He adds: “a government that cannot reform itself cannot reform its 
economy” (p. 338).  
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In accordance with his focus on spontaneous orders, Hayek (1973) insists on the 
spontaneous emergence of stable general laws, which are selected, applied and improved 
by judges in common law systems, and are more essential than government-led 
intentional legislation
3. This stance can be disputed on both empirical and theoretical 
grounds. Poland and Hungary have initially devoted a lot of efforts to the legal change, 
simultaneously with the change in property regime. The Czech Republic and Russia, on 
the contrary, gave priority to rapid privatization. Transition experience helps therefore 
to understand why legal rules are significant (section 3) and why depoliticization of 
economic activities is an ambiguous objective (section 4). The paper concludes by 
examining the relation between informal and legal institutions. 
1.  The priority to property rights, but property rights are not enough 
Giving special attention to the change of property rights was logical. The 
property system was the last economic pillar, which was largely excluded from failed 
reform attempts during the socialist period. Secure, exclusive, transferable private 
property rights represent the main element of the incentive system of a market 
economy. They are the necessary complement of financial discipline and competition, 
and allow the development of efficient product, factor and financial markets (World 
Bank, 1996). The Coase theorem moreover shows that the initial allocation of property 
rights does not matter from an efficiency perspective as long as they are clearly defined 
in the first place, and can be freely and costlessly contracted on and exchanged. On the 
contrary, poorly defined property rights, the lack of protection against theft and 
expropriation, the lack of contract enforcement, i.e. weak institutions, are all obstacles 
to efficiency (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995). 
The limits of the Coase theorem have nonetheless been repeatedly highlighted. 
Conditions necessary to reach efficient decentralized agreements, in terms of 
information and negotiation costs, are so strong that the theorem is a tautology. 
Contract incompleteness, making impossible a complete ex ante bargaining, invalidates 
the theorem. The latter ignores wealth effects, which are critical in transition economies 
where massive property transfers are at stake. But deeper difficulties arise. The first lies 
in the tendency to inflate the content of the definition. Demsetz (1967, p. 348) claims 
that “property rights specify how persons may be benefited and harmed, and therefore, 
who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons”. Pejovich (1994, p. 525) 
defines property rights as “relations among individuals that arise from the existence of 
scarce goods and pertain to their use”. As a matter of fact, Coase (1960, p. 19) does not 
speak of property rights but of “the arrangement of rights established by the law”. 
Coase’s decentralized solutions depend on the initial provision of these exchangeable 
legal rights, like the right to be free from a nuisance or the right to harm somebody. All 
the rights cannot therefore be analyzed as property rights
4. 
Secondly, can property rights be perfectly and clearly defined? Does the 
imprecision concern their content or their assignation? For a given asset, multiple uses 
are possible and can be divided among multiple agents. This complexity makes hardly 
                                                 
3 Nomos and thesis designate these two kinds of law. 
4 This definition problem also exists in empirical studies. For instance, Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 
(2000) range under the property rights heading very different phenomena: the possibility to use courts, 
government regulations, taxes, extralegal payments and bribes, other costs of doing business… This 
heterogeneity can explain why the empirical effect of the property rights variables is often insignificant 
or very fragile. 6 
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possible exhaustive, precise definitions and assignments. As emphasized in the modern 
property rights approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990), and 
following the path-breaking work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), a central component 
of ownership lies in residual rights of control over assets. The latter exist under two 
conditions: they have not been contracted on ex ante because contracts are absent or 
incomplete; strict legal provisions do not bind them. In that sense, they consist in 
unspecified rights. Instead of property rights per se, the most important issue then 
becomes the partition into legal, contractual, and residual rights. 
Furthermore, reasoning in terms of property rights does not lead to a convincing 
and fruitful theory of the firm (Nivet, 2003). The definition of property rights and the 
ensuing argumentation put forward by Coase (1960), Demsetz (1967), Furubotn and 
Pejovich (1972), Alchian (1987), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995), are essentially 
presented in terms of a single asset, and focus on the right to decide its uses. The firm is 
almost absent in this picture. This gap is perfectly illustrated in the analysis provided by 
World Bank (1996), where the connection between the developments on privatization 
of enterprises and the two initial paragraphs devoted to property rights is non-existent. 
The firm studied by Grossman and Hart (1986) remains composed of an individual 
owner-manager; ownership and control go together. It leads to a theory of firm 
boundaries, under the restrictive assumption of ex ante relationship-specific 
investments. Like in Williamson (1985), the focus is on inter-firm relations, hold-up 
problems and integration. And theories centered on property rights ultimately lead to 
very destructive and paradoxical conclusions. Shareholders own only their shares, not 
the corporation, and are accordingly not owners but lenders of capital (Demsetz, 1967). 
Ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept (Fama, 1980). Ordinary markets and 
firms are only competing types of markets (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Distinguishing 
things inside and outside the firm does not make sense (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the 
same for the distinction between intrafirm and interfirm transactions (Klein, 1983). The 
firm is dead (Alchian and Woodward, 1988). But understanding privatization is illusory 
if both ownership and the firm vanish. 
2.  The dismissal of state and legal interferences 
Several obstacles hindered the rapid emergence of an appropriate and effective 
legal infrastructure in transition economies (World Bank, 1996). In the socialist regime, 
laws and judicial decisions were discretionary instruments subordinated to political and 
bureaucratic decisions. The heritage accordingly includes the low legitimacy of legal 
institutions. Laws cannot be designed from scratch but should be made country specific, 
and adapted to cultural and legal norms, economic and financial structures, and to the 
general institutional framework
5. Central and Eastern European countries and Baltic 
States, contrary to CIS and China, could rely on local pre-war laws, but they were 
partially outdated. And the import of foreign laws is not a panacea. A negative 
“transplant effect” arises if law is not adapted to local conditions (Berkowitz, Pistor and 
Richard, 2003). Governments and Parliaments were unskilled and initially over-
burdened, making it necessary to have priorities in the legislative work. Efficient courts 
are necessary to fill the inevitable gaps through their interpretation of texts and their 
judicial decisions that develop precedents. The enforcement of good laws by courts or 
                                                 
5 For instance, Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000) note that the concept of fiduciary duty cannot be 
accurately translated into Russian legal language.  
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police can fail, due to insufficient legal skills and experience, overworked courts, or 
corruption favored by low salaries and lack of deontological rules
6. Lastly, the supply of 
legal rules and their enforcement are usually not sufficient. The demand for legal 
reforms and law is an essential complement. Economic liberalization providing market 
incentives and hardening budget constraints was prone to favor such a demand. 
Empirical studies suggest that alternative mechanisms are available in inter-firm 
relations, like reputation and authority mechanisms (De Sousa, 2002), relational 
networks and mutual commitments (Rizopoulos and Grégoire-Borzeda, 2001), personal 
relationships and trust  (Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman, 1998). From a theoretical point 
of view, transaction costs economics (Klein, 1980, 2000, Williamson, 1985, 1998) puts 
into perspective the importance of legal institutions and opposes the “legal centralism 
tradition”. It argues that private ordering and self-enforcing agreements provide 
substitutes for legally enforced detailed long-term contracts. Court ordering is a costly 
time consuming noisy process. It is often ill adapted and can be contrary to the intent of 
the contractual understanding, because it is based on general rules and imperfect 
information. Increased contractual specification and the threat of court enforcement 
could even create new problems and rigidity, and contribute to organize hold-up
7. 
Private internal and market enforcement mechanisms, like the threat of termination of 
business relationships would be more frequent and effective. 
More fundamentally, external interventions through law and regulations are 
considered in the theory of property rights as a restriction or “attenuation” of property 
rights (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). However, on Furubotn and Pejovich’s own 
testimony, this idea was incomplete because a theory of the state was lacking. Progress 
has been achieved in this direction, inspired by the transition experience (Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1995, 1996, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1994). Politicians and 
bureaucrats can use their political control rights on economic assets to impose political 
goals and private agenda on firms. So corruption represents an application of Coasian 
bargaining, and improves efficiency. But the “bribe contract” cannot be enforced in 
court and is open to ex post reneging. And bribing perspectives encourage the creation 
of new detrimental regulations. Depoliticization and deregulation are then priority 
objectives, and privatization represents the main means of action against political 
discretion. 
Corruption and taxation-regulation are essentially considered as sister activities, 
going grabbing hand in hand. On that score, the sizeable unofficial activities have been 
imputed to excessive taxation, regulation, and corruption (Johnson et al., 1997, 1998). It 
is nevertheless essential to stress that the matter is not the existence of taxation and 
regulation per se, as long as they are not confiscatory. Formally, the tax system introduces 
quasi-contractual rights. This quasi-contract is not freely chosen but the owner keeps 
benefiting from the residual income. Problems arise only when taxes are arbitrarily 
defined ex post in an unpredictable way and at extortionate levels, without effective legal 
recourse. In that case, the tax authority has no more quasi-contractual rights, but 
becomes residual claimant alongside the owner. Now empirical studies generally find a 
negative or insignificant relation between tax rates and the size of the shadow economy 
(Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998, Friedman et al., 2000). In Central 
                                                 
6 The same obstacles handicap privatization and regulation agencies. 
7 Klein (2000) offers such an interpretation of the famous General Motors-Fisher Body case. Other 
analysts dismiss this interpretation (see The Journal of Law & Economics, 43 (1), April 2000). 8 
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European countries, no significant relation exists at the firm level between tax payments 
and the share of underreported sales (Johnson, Kaufmann, et al., 2000). 
All the same the state is still considered first and foremost as the main threat to 
property rights. From that viewpoint, rapid economic reforms, mainly privatization, 
bring about the initially missing private business. The latter would resist undue state 
interventions through the political process (Rapaczynski, 1996), and press to introduce 
political and institutional reforms, including good laws and regulations conforming to 
the standard business practices (Hay, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996, Shleifer, 1997). The 
development of property rights and legal systems should be a product of market forces, 
preferred to governmental fiat and legislation. In accordance with Hayek’s views, 
changes of rules are an unconscious product of endogenous competitive processes, and 
derive from individual actions based on learning and experience. Consciously designed 
legal institutions and regulations are secondary and require an already functioning 
private property regime. The rapid creation of better laws is not a priority because they 
would remain pieces of paper and lack supporting market-driven institutions (Frydman 
and Rapaczynski, 1994, Pejovich, 1994, Rapaczynski, 1996)
8. 
The history of common law systems demonstrate that laws are more often the 
endogenous evolutionary products of practices and idiosyncratic historical 
developments, than the outcome of intellectual deliberations by jurists or economists 
(Black, Kraakman and Hay, 1996). Rights emerge from below, from established 
individual modes of behavior. This would notably be the case for the corporation as a 
legal entity and the laws applying to it (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, North, 1983). In the 
early modern Europe, courts specialized in commercial disputes were less significant 
than internal voluntary mechanisms designed by the contractors themselves, like internal 
codes of conduct in merchant guilds. The state became a major player only when its 
credibility, conditional on its fiscal needs, improved (North, 1991). 
The previous arguments, inspired by the American system, militate against 
significant initial efforts in building legal foundations. In that vision, the scarce political 
energy should be directed to ensure rapid privatization during the narrow window of 
opportunity. The need for depoliticization makes privatization urgent and makes it 
impossible to wait for the time-consuming implementation of good laws. Self-regulation 
and self-enforcement provide better remedies. Uncertainty and the unpredictability of 
bad and good practices call for limited, pragmatic, flexible laws, and more generally 
flexible institutional structures allowing successful evolution and adaptative efficiency. 
The reliance on court enforcement will be facilitated if the rules follow and formalize 
existing business and contracting practices. Fundamentally, contracting, based on 
individual free consent and autonomy, is preferable to law, prescribing statutes, rights 
and duties independently of agents' consent
9. 
Corporate laws offer an enlightening illustration. Two Western models are 
usually distinguished. The enabling or accompanying model, existing now in the United 
                                                 
8 Pejovich (1994) simultaneously states that a priority is to establish the rule of law, independent courts 
and a credible and stable legal system, all being a critical requirement for the development of the 
competitive market for institutions. But if rules come from agents and are competitively tried and 
selected, how can they be established and stable? 
9 The same “philosophical” difference opposes accounting systems. The International Accounting 
Standards offer explicit general principles whose letter and spirit should be followed. The US General 
Accepted Accounting Principles allow interpretation and significant accounting creativeness. The latter 
have been a key ingredient in the Enron affair.  
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States and in Great Britain, leaves managers with extensive discretion and shareholders 
with great flexibility in the choice of internal structures and contracting solutions. 
Market mechanisms, private institutions, and cultural norms provide incentives to 
maximize profit. Sophisticated and effective judicial and administrative instances of last 
resort address enforcement and litigation problems
10. The prohibitory model applied in 
the United States and Great Britain a century ago, remains partially in Continental 
Western Europe today. It is founded on substantive protections, flat prohibitions of 
behavior conducive to abuses, and strong judicial and administrative enforcement. 
Obstacles to contracting and market mechanisms made the first model ill suited to 
transition economies. Conversely, the reliance on courts and formal enforcement was 
difficult, because public organizations functioned badly. So a third new model, 
supposedly adapted to transition constraints, has been advocated. It includes few rigid 
prohibitions, private enforcement of public rules, voluntary compliance, self-protection 
and self-discipline (Black, Kraakman and Hay, 1996, Hay and Shleifer, 1998)
11. Actions 
by direct actors (shareholders, directors, managers) are preferred to decisions by external 
actors (judges, legal professionals…). But this faith in the respect of the law without 
reliance on external enforcement, intervention and sanction, is illusory. 
3.  The significance of legal rules and third parties 
Exchanges can be based on kinship, trust, ethnic or religious relationships, 
where the threat of being excluded or punished acts as a discipline device. Pre-modern 
organizations relied on non-contractual multilateral tools, facilitating mutual 
information, and coordinated punishments and rewards of members and external rulers 
(Greif, 1993, Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994). The threat of losing reputation and 
the prospect of long-term relationships are however weakened when future uncertainty 
is high and time horizons shortened. Moreover, during the transition period, reputation 
looses part of its effectiveness, because breaking rules and grasping new opportunities 
often bring about sizeable benefits. These informal mechanisms tend to be effective 
only in groups with few players and repeated interactions, where the detection of a 
deviant behavior is easier, the costs for the excluded person and the gains for excluding 
people significant. These characteristics exist in inter-firm relations, but are generally 
missing in other contexts, like the relations between corporate shareholders and 
managers
12. 
Networks and collective action are essential ingredients of informal norms. They 
reduce their capacity of reacting to exogenous changes (Greif, 1993). The decentralized 
nature of enforcement makes likely free riding behavior. Large changes of norms are 
very costly and unlikely. Slow and incremental evolution is accordingly the rule, which 
can be problematic in a rapidly evolving society (Posner, 1997). Social conventions can 
                                                 
10 This legal model echoes the positive theory of agency, according to which agency costs are 
endogenously minimized through market mechanisms and the separation of control and ownership is 
optimal (Nivet, 2003).  
11 Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) are then in bad faith, when they assert: 
“commentators on transition from socialism see the reform of the public legal system as an antidote to 
the violence associated with private enforcement (e.g., Hay and Shleifer [1998] and Hay, Shleifer and 
Vishny [1996]” (note 1 p. 454).  
12 For example, informal employment relations based on verbal agreements proved relatively rare in the 
new Russian private sector. They concerned essentially friends and relatives of the owner-employer, and 
were mainly relied upon in very small, informal family businesses (Clarke and Borisov, 1999). 10 
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even become retrogressive (Arrow, 1974). Markets need pro-market social norms to 
work, but these norms do not appear spontaneously and instantaneously, specially in 
societies where the market has been repressed for decades. State enforced laws turn out 
to be more effective institutions in complex societies, even if law and social norms 
maintain dual relations, being simultaneously complements and substitutes. Free 
abstract contracting requires faith in a third guarantor, usually personified by courts and 
the state. And law should help in the battle against misconduct, bad social norms, and 
substitute for missing ethics. 
The Coase theorem helps to clarify the role of laws. Voluntary exchange and 
participation can hinder ex ante Coasian efficient bargaining from taking place (Dixit 
and Olson, 2000). It makes helpful the involvement of third parties, coercion and 
compulsory centralized solutions through external formal rules. Laws fundamentally 
reduce transaction costs. They define what kinds of contracts are necessary and valid, 
and express general standardized principles and frames, according to which precise 
contracts can be tailored to specific conditions. They consequently reduce the number 
of potential ex post conflicts. They prohibit some kinds of contractual provisions, even 
if they are voluntarily agreed upon. This restriction of individual contracting freedom is 
a recognition that interests of non-contracting parties should also be protected, and that 
freedom can be partially illusory, because it depends on personal income and ownership. 
Laws also facilitate ex post bargaining and conflicts resolution, and consequently 
facilitate ex ante contracting. Bankruptcy law is a good example. Debt contracts are 
incomplete and do not generally include private solutions in case of default, which can 
lead to an uncoordinated inefficient run among creditors or an inefficient agreement 
between numerous shareholders and creditors. General external rules enforced by an 
external party (judge, official receiver) become necessary. Laws can in some cases hinder 
efficient ex post voluntary agreements, but potential ex post inefficiencies can be 
necessary to achieve ex ante efficiency. Finally, even if laws, like contracts, can not and 
should not be complete, for flexibility reasons, both are complementary. 
Furthermore, ownership has a fundamental legal basis
13. The main advantage of 
modern corporations highlighted by the property rights school derives from their legal 
nature, namely from limited liability
14. The latter protects shareholders against adverse 
management decisions and allows unrestricted and anonymous share trading. Hence 
these protections rest on laws, and especially corporate laws. They give a legal status and 
personality before relying to contracting. They set general objectives, organizational 
principles, rights and obligations of organization's members and contracting parties. 
These legal provisions allow the corporation to continue when some contracts are 
broken. External rules protecting shareholders are essential because rights conveyed by 
shares are ambiguous and incomplete. Shares do not include a pre-fixed promised 
payment, contrary to standard debt and labor contracts. The room for opportunism is 
accordingly larger, monitoring and acknowledgment of default more difficult. 
Corporations are then privileged channels of abuses if legal provisions are lacking or 
inappropriate. The problem is exacerbated in privatization dealings, because 
privatization is fundamentally a legal change in the identity of residual claimants, which 
is not automatically accompanied by a parallel change in the allocation of residual rights 
                                                 
13 At a basic level, the right to own property and to be guarded against arbitrary deprivation is recognized 
in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and should be constitutionally protected. 
14 Jensen and Meckling (1976) characterize the private corporation as a “legal fiction”, becoming a nexus 
of contracts.  
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of control. And protection of shareholders was even more urgent in transition 
countries, because enterprises which would typically be owned and controlled by 
individuals or family in other regions, are there corporations, often with dispersed and 
unskilled stockholders. In addition, numerous ailing companies were waiting for 
liquidation or reorganization. 
In some transition countries, the first policies towards enterprises have been of a 
legal nature. The perceived urgency in Hungary and Poland has been to enact new laws 
preventing the private misappropriation of public assets through self-dealings and sale 
to related parties. This legal reaction against “spontaneous” or “wild” privatization of 
state-owned enterprises sent an important signal
15. The protection of property rights 
should not be limited to private ones. Another major step prior to privatization lies in 
the corporatization of state enterprises, i.e. the change of their legal status and their 
conversion into limited liability companies fully owned by the state, whose 
representatives seat on boards. Besides, Hungary has been active in the enforcement of 
bankruptcy law. A major feature of the successful bankruptcy law in Hungary and law 
on bad debts in Poland lies in the fact that they relied mainly on decentralized 
negotiations between creditors and debtors. But the main outcome of quickly imposing 
laws has been to trigger change
16. The prior design of a comprehensive legal and 
regulatory environment also significantly contributed to the initial development of the 
Warsaw stock exchange (Nivet, 1997). 
The Czech Republic initially adopted a different attitude and dismissed legal 
interventionism
17. It postponed the installation of a securities commission and the 
implementation of bankruptcy law after the completion of the privatization program. 
The latter, based on vouchers and free entry of privatization intermediaries, has been 
initially praised as the most successful in giving birth to real property rights 
(Rapaczynski, 1996). The millions of private shareholders would create political 
pressures to defend their rights. Investment funds, driven by reputation concerns, 
would defend the interests of shareholders. The reliance on competitive market 
mechanisms, contrary to the bureaucratic creation of Polish privatization funds, would 
allow “to privatize privatization” (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). The emergence of 
privatization funds was actually largely unexpected and took place in a legal quasi-
vacuum, which opened room for numerous opportunistic actions by the management of 
funds. Tunneling, siphoning off assets and skimming profits have been common 
practices. Insider dealings and opaque trading have undermined the stock exchange
18. 
                                                 
15 In the analysis offered by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995), spontaneous privatization is favorable, 
because political control vanishes. 
16 Stiglitz (2000) maintains on the contrary that formal bankruptcy brings about few restructurings. 
17 Using the Heritage Foundation's measure of regulation in 1996, the Czech Republic is the only country 
to get the score of 1, while most OECD countries get the score of 2. 
18 Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) praise the self-regulation (opposed to regulation by third party) of 
Russian stock markets. Johnson and Shleifer (1999) attribute conversely the near collapse of Czech 
stock markets to the hands-off regulation. “Some Coasians” would have ignored that the Coase 
theorem identifies laws and regulation, alongside private contracting, as remedies to inefficiencies. 
Johnson and Shleifer recognize however that they have difficulty finding in Coase's writings a positive 
assessment of government regulation. References to Coase have been almost completely removed in 
the revised version of the paper (Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer, 2001), which nonetheless retains its 
title. These contradictions illustrate the ambiguity and danger of the theorem. As a matter of fact, Coase 
(1960) fundamentally recommends private decentralized solutions, and challenges Pigou’s approach 
advocating regulation or taxation.  12 
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The change in the political party in power and the prospective membership of European 
Union subsequently prompted correction through a deep legislative effort
19.  
In Russia, commercial, corporate and securities laws were rudimentary, 
incomplete and inconsistent at the time privatization has been implemented. It has been 
blamed on the Russian historical tradition of weakened rule of the law. But it was more 
fundamentally a choice, founded on arguments presented in the previous section. This 
legal vacuum, coupled with the entrenchment of insiders favored by the privatization 
program, encouraged detrimental and fraudulent behavior in Russian corporations
20: 
missing shareholder meetings, manipulation of voting and share trading, dilution of 
external shareholding, sale of products and assets to affiliated parties at transfer pricing 
or even without payment… The banking sector provides another example of legal 
laxity. The initial regulation of bank entry was overly permissive. In 1998, the financial 
collapse triggered massive asset stripping at the expense of banks' depositors, without 
proper reaction by courts or the Central Bank. 
It is only in January 1996 that a new corporate law is applied, more than four 
years after the beginning of the privatization program. It is drafted according to the 
previously discussed self-enforcing model (Black, Kraakman and Hay, 1996, Hay and 
Shleifer, 1998). But are self-enforcement mechanisms effective? Black, Kraakman and 
Hay (1996) answer in the affirmative, counting on peer and reputation effects, social 
negative consequences of misbehavior, risk of retaliation, extralegal enforcement tools 
like violence or threat of violence exercised by injured shareholders. Yet, the 
effectiveness of informal mechanisms, like social sanctions or reputation, is doubtful in 
the transition period. And invoking illegal means to enforce legal rules proves worrying. 
The injuring party is more ready and able to rely on violence. If private violence is 
tolerated, it is used to impose bad private rules and encourages organized crime. 
Lastly most of debates focus on inter-firms relations and investor rights
21. It is 
consistent with the standard conception of corporate governance, centered on the 
provision of external financial means. A larger view suggests that all stakeholders, 
including employees, are involved in firm’s performance. And legal rules on labor 
contracts prove essential because disputes are prone to arise, in relation with contractual 
provisions and residual control rights given to the employer. More fundamentally, labor 
laws are essential in facilitating specialization and division of labor, and in ensuring 
social cohesion. The failure of the Russian legal environment applies to labor relations 
too. Wage arrears have been pervasive in Russia and CIS countries, far less frequent in 
Central Europe. They testify that labor contracts were not respected. Wage arrears are 
equivalent to a forced loan from the worker to the firm, notably imposed on workers 
with few outside options. Employees become unwitting residual claimants, and their 
basic rights are flouted. Mobility costs were increased and bias in favor of multiple jobs 
and informal sector introduced, because employees usually lost their wage claims if they 
                                                 
19 Roland and Verdier (2003) show how accession to the European Union can solve coordination 
problems in law enforcement. 
20 Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000) offer a vivid discussion and numerous astonishing examples of 
these misbehaviors. 
21 Transition countries would have on average reached rapidly from 1992 to 1998 remarkable levels of 
shareholder and creditor legal protection. For instance, most CIS countries score higher than France or 
Germany (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 2000). But legal effectiveness differs greatly among transition 
countries.  
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left the firm
22. Payments in kind also undermined employees’ rights, because they 
restricted the exchange possibilities compared with monetary payments. Such practices 
deeply weakened the individual confidence in contractual relations. The confidence of 
citizens in the government greatly eroded as well. 
4.  Depoliticization, corruption and democracy 
Privatization, deregulation, tax reductions, and laissez faire policies have been 
forcefully advocated as a mean to achieve depoliticization of economic activities. This 
objective was consistent with the vision according to which institutional development 
conducive to long-run economic growth requires the reduction of arbitrary state 
economic intervention (North, 1990, 1991). However, making depoliticization the 
central concern of privatization leads to a contradiction, because property rights are 
redistributed and enforced through the polity in the first place. The fact that politicians 
are not benevolent, which justifies privatization, makes simultaneously likely 
opportunist, inefficient privatization policies. How can state servants use their 
monopoly power over violence to guarantee secure property rights but refrain from 
confiscating assets and capitalizing political powers into economic ones
23? Who guards 
the guardians? During transition, this question is central for corporate governance but 
also for public and political governances. In both political and economic spheres, 
delegation of powers requires appropriate incentives, through external and internal 
competitive procedures, checks and balances, restricted mandates. Controlling 
governmental behavior and power requires political guarantees and procedures, 
including transparency, publicizing of decisions, and deliberative processes giving 
political actors a sense of responsibility and accountability. Constitutional restraints are 
essential, as well as the distinction between independent executive, legislative and 
judiciary powers, complemented by independent mass media and civic groups
24.  
In countries like Russia, however, democratic principles form the subject of very 
ambiguous positions. The call for “dictatorship of the law” by Vladimir Putin reflects 
this ambiguity. The historical tradition of absolutist autocratic governments and 
weakened rule of the law can be put forward, but is only part of the story. Parliament 
has been primarily considered as a major obstacle. The comprehensive powers granted 
to the President in the new constitution allowed Boris Yeltsin to impose major decisions 
through decrees. One of the consequences for Russian politics lies in the absence of 
organized and long-lasting reformist democratic parties, as opposed to ad hoc election 
stables. Besides, the liberal law on right of association voted in 1995 has been hardened. 
Administrative and fiscal harassment is frequent against organizations, which are 
considered politically unfriendly by authorities. A significant number of Russian people 
                                                 
22 The upholding of the residence certificate (“propiska”), despite decisions by the Russian Constitutional 
Court, also restricts labor mobility and undermines individual freedom, because it conditions access to 
work, housing, health care… In addition, it favors discrimination and corruption. 
23 North (1991) remarks that private profit opportunities can be created by political organizations 
establishing property rights that redistributed rather than increased income. Only external constraints 
on the ruler’s power can limit arbitrary seizure of assets. It necessitates a fundamental change of the 
polity, like in England after 1688. Self-restraint of the ruler is fragile and usually abandoned during fiscal 
crisis and war periods. Both factors have notably been present in contemporary Russia. 
24 Civic groups allow overcoming the traditional free riding behavior in political action. And non-state 
organizations can make available services or goods not provided by the state (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). In 
Eastern Europe, the nonprofit sector remains small though often growing, financially fragile and 
dependent on the state. 14 
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believe that a strong man is called for, rather than improved democratic political 
institutions. And Vladimir Putin is striving to embody this man. 
From a theoretical point of view, political competition would favor patronage, 
whose political benefits are on the contrary zero under “a perfectly secure dictatorship” 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Hay and Shleifer (1998) then consider that strengthening 
the legal and administrative apparatus would worsen things, without a benevolent 
dictatorship or a very strong and unified democratically elected government. These 
positions are reminiscent of the criticism made by Hayek (1979) of unlimited democracy 
and weak governments dependent on interest groups, leading him to propose the 
introduction of significant limits. But it is worth emphasizing that substantial progress in 
legal and institutional environments has been achieved in Hungary and Poland, where 
democratic governments have been unstable and far from being very strong and unified. 
Economic activities remain highly politicized in Russia, despite the initial priority 
given to privatization. The presidential office directly manages sizeable industrial and 
real estate activities without any external control. Scandals involving political or high 
administrative officials have been numerous. The impenetrable relations between 
presidency, government and “oligarchs”, and clan struggles have been repeatedly 
discussed. The “NTV affair”, involving in 2001 the independent group Media-Most 
owned by Vladimir Gousinski, illustrates them. Although NTV, like many other 
corporations, had financial troubles for a long time, it is only when it has been 
considered politically dangerous, that the major creditor connected with the 
government, namely Gazprom, intervened and took control, violating at the same time 
shareholders rights. The recent “Yukos affair”, with the seizure of shares and the 
imprisonment of Mikhaïl Khodorkovski, includes other ingredients: the spectacular 
arrest by secret police agents, the fiscal justification (tax evasion), the intervention in a 
strategic lucrative sector (oil industry), the neutralization of an oligarch and a potential 
powerful political opponent just before the 2003 general election. These “political 
takeovers” testify that public tools (tax department, secret police, justice) are used 
through a fully discretionary manner to satisfy private political and financial goals. They 
reflect the worrying concentration of political, judiciary, economic and media powers. 
Privatization often led to wealth expropriation rather than wealth creation. The 
institutional environment made more attractive parasitical activities, like rent-seeking, 
legal gambits and organized crime
25. Transition favors corruption for at least three 
reasons. Economic liberalization opens new profitable opportunities. Monetary bribes 
are easier because money becomes more active, and opens new access to valuable 
goods. The repression led by the autocratic communist party is not instantaneously 
replaced by efficient democratic and legal tools. Moreover, looting of firms often 
provides a less risky, more rapid and significant gain than restructuring. But Russian 
privatization, especially the “loans-for-shares” program in 1995, largely instilled the 
culture of law avoidance and encouraged the emergence of plutocrats and crooks. It 
contributed to entrench corruption and crime, and undermined the trust of the 
population in public organizations, law and reforms
26. Finally a majority of citizens in 
                                                 
25 Baumol (1990) examines historical examples of unproductive and destructive activities rewarded by 
institutions, like those of landholders and politicians in Ancient Rome or state bureaucracy in Medieval 
China. He notes that “enterprising use of the legal system for rent-seeking purposes has a long history” 
(p. 907). 
26 Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) consider the Russian mass privatization program as a success owed 
to Minister Anatoli Chubais’ political skills. But Anatoli Chubais became known as the “chief grab- 
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many transition countries considers officials, politicians and mafia as the main agents 
who gained from the transition. 
General studies of corruption conclude that historical economic and political 
factors have more robust explanatory power than cultural predisposition (Bardhan, 
1997, La Porta et al., 1999a, Rose-Ackerman, 2000, Treisman, 2000). The fight against 
corruption proves accordingly difficult and slow. Long-lasting democratic regime and 
economic development are missing in transition countries, and cannot be relied upon to 
explain why Russia is more affected by corruption than Central Europe. In addition, if 
socialist or French civil laws countries exhibit higher degree of government regulation 
and lower quality of property rights protection, corruption does not exhibit regularities 
ascribable to legal families (La Porta et al., 1999a). And redistribution organized through 
appropriate tax and social policies can improve state legitimacy and efficiency, especially 
in a period of growing inequalities and weakened proximity solidarity. A clear empirical 
relation between corruption and the extent of state economic intervention does not 
exist (Treisman, 2000). 
The influence of public bodies on business has nevertheless been the preferred 
one-sided explanation of transition results (Frye and Shleifer, 1997, Johnson, Kaufmann 
et al., 2000, Shleifer, 1997). Poland would have followed the “invisible-hand” model, 
where benevolent governments restrict themselves to the provision of public goods. 
Russia would be the victim of the “grabbing-hand” model, where formerly communist 
local politicians and bureaucrats pursue private goals through heavy taxes, extensive 
interventions, red tape and predatory regulations eliciting bribes
27. Russian managers 
would be in particular unable to respect the law and be truthful towards investors about 
financial results, because they must lie to officials (Black et al., 1996, 2000). But a careful 
scrutiny of empirical surveys elicits important qualifications of this stylized presentation. 
The share of shop managers considering that they can use courts against the 
government or a business partner is higher in Moscow than in Warsaw. Bribing occurs 
on average rarely or sometimes, and most managers maintain that local governments do 
not influence small business (Frye and Shleifer, 1997)
28. Bribing government officials is 
more pervasive for private manufacturing firms, and is significantly related to output 
hiding in Central Europe (Johnson, Kaufmann et al., 2000). However, as noted by the 
authors, bribes could simply be needed to make possible output underreporting. And in 
Russia and Ukraine, hidden activities are significantly negatively correlated with 
payments to government and extra-legal payments to officials, and significantly 
positively correlated with the confidence in the legal system. These last results go 
counter to the traditional view. 
The dominant interpretation considers that private protection provides private 
enforcement of law and order and replaces the missing public protection. But private 
protectors easily turn into private predators, creating threats and then offering their 
services to extract rents in official and unofficial sectors. Racketing of small shops is 
                                                                                                                                          
privatizer” (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000). The “loans-for-shares” program proves that 
scandals are not circumscribed to mass privatization plans. After the Czechoslovak divorce, the voucher 
privatization program has been replaced in Slovakia by outrageous sales in favor of President Meciar's 
allies. 
27 China, like other Asian countries before, would benefit from the “helping-hand” model, where 
bureaucratic interventions promote private activities and legal rules play a limited role. Still, data on 
corruption (Bardhan, 1997, Treisman, 2000) testify from close scores for Russia, Ukraine, China or 
Vietnam. 
28 Shleifer (1997) comments this same survey but omits to mention this response. 16 
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more frequent in Moscow than in Warsaw (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). Paying for private 
protection is an extremely developed practice in Russia and Ukraine for manufacturing 
firms (Johnson, Kaufmann et al., 2000). The fact that only a fifth of these firms agrees to 
provide information about their owners, while the response rate is near 100% in Central 
European countries, can be interpreted as a signal of a massive mafia presence. For 
Central European enterprises, the variable “payments for protection” is significantly 
negatively correlated with the variable “courts can enforce contracts”. Such a correlation 
does not exist for Russian and Ukrainian firms. And the correlation between payments 
for mafia protection and extra-legal payments to officials is very close to 1. The 
“grabbing-hand” is accordingly private as well as political or bureaucratic. Corruption, 
bureaucratic opportunism and organized crime tend to develop together. Legal and 
democratic remedies are requested, for which neither rapid privatization nor upholding 
public ownership are substitutes. 
5.  Conclusion 
Many institutions, including social norms and trust, customs, standards of 
conduct, beliefs, ethics, are of an informal nature. They usually evolve historically 
according to slow, incremental and potentially sub-optimal dynamics, dependent on 
economic, political, social, educational and cultural factors (North, 1990, Posner, 1997). 
Many social institutions are inherited, implicit general rules, and result from individual 
human action, but not from a conscious, rationalist human design. They allow to reach 
complex and abstract self-organized spontaneous orders (kosmos), which are according 
to Hayek (1973) more fundamental than made orders and organizations (taxis) based on 
purposeful arrangements, hierarchical relations and simple specific rule. 
Path dependence thus originates from belief systems and routines founded on 
past experience and cultural historical heritages (North, 2000). It makes unique the 
experience of every society. Capitalist systems exhibit great historical and national 
diversity. Asian experience would testify that durable economic development is 
attainable despite an underdeveloped legal infrastructure, thanks to the reliance on 
tradition, networks and trust. The success of Chinese township-village enterprises 
(TVEs) would deny the culture free, universal applicability of the property rights theory 
(Weitzman, 1993). Chinese culture and path-dependent historical heritage would 
promote cooperative behavior, making unnecessary explicit rules, laws, and procedures. 
The heavy communist and Marxist heritage would on the contrary be based on eroded 
work and business ethics, low moral order and generalized opportunism (Winiecki, 
1998), pro-collectivist, anti-individualist and nationalist ethos (Pejovich, 1994). Post-
socialist economies would follow differentiated national trajectories, whose shape is 
influenced by initial conditions, social and political contexts. They would be various 
path-dependent mixed economies, with an uncertain and open future (Chavance and 
Magnin, 1997). 
Therefore, “privatization is not a panacea” (North, 1994, p. 366). Policies are 
fundamentally rough and imperfect tools because they alter at best formal rules, not 
informal ones (North, 2000). Changing formal rules would not be sufficient to trigger a 
change in behavior. A market economy cannot be simply legislated, decreed or installed 
from above. Standard reforms package would have been based on a tabula rasa top-
down approach, considering history essentially as impediment (Murrell, 1995). 
Exogenous institutional changes introduced purposely by fiat, like privatization of state 
enterprises, would be pointless (Pejovich, 1994). Government-led programs are prone  
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to fail because of their “constructivist” pretension to build capitalism. In accordance 
with Hayekian principles, alternative recommendations advocate bottom-up 
experiments and trial and error processes, benefiting from decentralized knowledge, and 
favoring self-transformation and learning by agents (Murrell, 1993, 1995, Pejovich, 1994, 
Stiglitz, 2000). 
Yet, these principles can hardly be used to conceive better comprehensive 
transition policies. Limited prediction and prescription capacities are indeed 
consubstantial with their general philosophy. An exclusive focus on cultural, historical 
and national factors can lead to ad hoc reasoning, evasion in historical and cultural 
determinism, and the denial of explanatory powers of economic mechanisms. The path 
dependence concept especially tends to be systematically or loosely relied on, and 
confused with inertia and persistence. Corruption is a good case in point. Game 
theoretic models usually exhibit multiple equilibria, making initial conditions, historical 
paths, and expectations essential persistent determinants of corruption. But the 
“moralist” view, calling for a deep change in values and norms of honesty, or the 
“fatalist” position, arguing that deeply rooted corruption cannot be attacked, are not 
fruitful (Bardhan, 1997). An appropriate change in incentive structures is able to deliver 
positive outcomes. Then, if transition is a curious mixture of revolution and evolution 
(Kornai, 2000), the first element should not be overlooked. Institutional theories 
concentrate essentially on the second. The change of property relations and formal rules 
was the major available tool to trigger evolution of behavior (Grosfeld, 1995). It is the 
same even for the United States, where the fight against fraudulent financial conducts 
demands the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley act and a fierce judicial activism by the 
attorney-general of New York state, Eliot Spitzer. 
In the conception influenced by the Anglo-Saxon experience and defended by 
Hayek (1973), legal systems should protect the power and freedom of property owners 
vis-à-vis the state. Common law, its respect for just procedures and the precedents made 
by judges provide recourse against state regulation and expropriation. On the contrary, 
civil law is considered as a centrally created instrument furthering state power and 
intervention. Political freedom would also be higher in the former system, because 
economic and political freedoms go together. The post-communist transition experience 
qualifies this belief. Privatization represents the first engine to reach the ruling elite’s 
private objectives and is not spontaneously directed towards depoliticization of 
economic activities. Agents empowered by privatization tend to resist reforms 
improving legal institutions. And predation is not limited to anti-reform politicians and 
bureaucrats “grabbing” private assets. Law should protect citizens, primarily those 
deprived of property, against state representatives (including “reformers”), property 
owners, and criminals, because the latter tend to collude or merge. 
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